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Abstract
To promote stockpiling of anti-viral drugs by non-government organizations
such as hospitals, drug manufacturers have introduced Manufacturer Reserve
Programs which, for an annual fee, provide the right to buy in the event of
a severe outbreak of influenza. We show that these programs enhance drug
manufacturer profits but could either increase or decrease the amount of pre-
pandemic stockpiling of anti-viral drugs.
1 Introduction
One of the available weapons for fighting pandemic influenza are anti-viral drugs.
Currently, four antiviral medications - oseltamivir, zanamivir, amantadine, and ri-
mantadine - are approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for prevention
and/or treatment of influenza. While the eﬃcacy of particular drugs against novel
influenza viruses during a pandemic remains uncertain, oseltamivir and zanamivir
are the recommended first-line drugs of choice due to resistance patterns of known
circulating viruses. Oseltamivir is sold as Tamiflu
R°
by Hoﬀman-La Roche, while
zanamivir is sold as Relenza
R°
by GlaxoSmithKline.
Given the speed by which pandemic influenza can spread, if anti-viral drugs are
to play a role in its curtailment, it will require adequate stockpiling of these drugs.
For this purpose, the Center for Disease Control has accumulated millions of courses
of anti-viral drugs in the Strategic National Stockpile. At the same time, private
organizations - such as hospitals - are encouraged to form their own stockpiles. To
∗The authors are grateful to the referees and the editor, Thomas McGuire, for their comments.
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reduce the upfront outlay to a customer, Hoﬀman-La Roche and GlaxoSmithKline
have each recently developed a Manufacturer Reserve Program (MRP). Launched
in June 2008, the Roche Antiviral Protection Program (RAPP) holds one course of
Tamiflu in its inventory for an annual reserve fee (which is low relative to the purchase
price of the drug).1 The holder of a RAPP contract has the right to buy a single
course at the regular price with delivery within 24-48 hours.2 Thus, rather than
immediately purchasing at the regular price to stockpile on its own, an organization
can purchase the right to buy and thereby ensure supply. GlaxoSmithKline oﬀers a
similar program for Relenza
R°
, called Pandemic Readiness for Employers Program
(PREP).
The objective of this paper is to analyze Manufacturer Reserve Programs with
regards to their pricing and how they impact the incentives of the drug manufacturers
to build inventories in preparation for pandemic influenza. A starting point to our
analysis is that an unconstrained purely profit-maximizing drug company would sig-
nificantly increase the price of its anti-viral drug in response to pandemic influenza, in
order to extract some of the pandemic-induced surplus realized by consumers. How-
ever, both political and ethical concerns make such a pricing strategy unlikely; drug
manufacturers would be subject to intense political pressure not to raise the price
of anti-viral drugs in response to the societal calamity of a pandemic. Due to that
political and ethical constraint, a drug manufacturer is limited in how much surplus
it can extract through the pricing of the drug itself. We show that a Manufacturer
Reserve Program is able to extract some of that surplus, though it is not as eﬀec-
tive as being able to raise the drug price when there is a pandemic. A second and
more important result is that Manufacturer Reserve Programs can either result in an
increase or decrease of pre-pandemic stockpiling.
Related Literature There is a vast literature that explores pricing with demand
uncertainty - both at the individual and aggregate level - but none that considers
"right to buy" programs.3 In considering this literature, one can ask how firms and
consumers could respond to demand uncertainty which reveals itself over time. One
approach is to adjust price as agents learn about demand. Such price adjustment can
also be a method for engaging in price discrimination when buyers are heterogeneous.
This approach is examined in Courty and Li (2000) and Nolke and Peitz (2007). As
we’ve argued that there are political and ethical constraints limiting the ability to
raise price in response to a severe outbreak of influenza, the option of adjusting price
over time is not available to a manufacturer of anti-viral drugs.
A second approach to handling demand uncertainty is to ex ante set diﬀerent
prices for diﬀerent units. The optimality of such an approach is established in Dana
(1999). A firm sets price before demand uncertainty is realized which, in our setting,
corresponds to setting price before it is learned there is a pandemic. What a firm
1In the case of one hospital, the annual fee for RAPP was about 7.5% of the cost of buying the
drug. The drug has a shelf life of about five years.
2Details on this plan can be found at <www.pandemictoolkit.com/tamiflu-
supplyordering/stockpiling-dilemma.aspx>.
3For a general survey, see Stole (2007). There is, of course, a huge finance literature on call
options but that work is very diﬀerent from what is considered here.
2
does is to set multiple prices and limit how much supply is available at each price;
for example, providing 10,000 units at a price of $50 and 1,000,000 units at a price
of $200. In this way, a firm can eﬀectively charge a higher price in response to a
positive aggregate demand shock as the high priced units will only be bought in that
demand state. We do not permit such a pricing mechanism in our model because it is
equivalent to raising price in response to a severe outbreak, and therefore is likely to
be construed as a violation of the political and ethical constraints mentioned above.
It is true that there is a similarity between setting two diﬀerent product prices - with
units priced at the higher level only being purchased in the high demand state - and
our mechanism of setting one product price and selling the right to buy - which a
consumer exercises only in the high demand state. However, the pricing mechanisms
are not equivalent because the right to buy is purchased before a consumer learns the
demand state, while with the multi-price scheme consumers purchase after learning
the demand state. In fact, we show that the right to buy does not extract surplus as
eﬀectively as setting diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent demand states.
2 Model
Assume there is one consumer type who, if having developed a need for an anti-
viral drug during a pandemic - either for prophylaxis or treatment - values the drug
v.4 The probability of a pandemic occurring is α and, in that event, the amount
of need for the drug, denoted eq, is random - as it depends on the intensity of the
pandemic - and distributed according to the twice diﬀerentiable cdf F : [0, 1]→ [0, 1].
Assume F 0 > 0, for all eq ∈ [0, 1] . Normalizing the population mass to one, eq is to be
interpreted as the fraction of the population that demands the anti-viral drug in the
event of a pandemic. The primary purpose for having pandemic severity be random
is so that consumers, even if they know the inventory of the company, are uncertain
about availability of supply when there is a pandemic.
The price that the manufacturer can anticipate receiving in the event of a pan-
demic is fixed at some level, denoted p.What is crucial for the ensuing analysis is that
p < v. The most natural motivation for this assumption is that the manufacturer
anticipates some chance of being constrained in how much it can raise price should a
pandemic occur. These constraints could be political - as the government limits how
much the manufacturer can raise price in the face of a public health emergency - or
ethical - as the manufacturer’s executives conclude that the morally right decision is
to sacrifice profit for the social good. Political constraints could take the form of price
caps based on the Medicaid rate, possible prosecution for price gouging or "excessive
pricing" (which is an antitrust violation in some countries), or pressure from elected
oﬃcials (with the looming threat of price regulation). As long as there is some prob-
ability that price is constrained then the expected pandemic price will be less than
4While assuming a single type is done for simplicity, it also serves to distinguish the forces we
identify from those that are due to consumer heterogeneity and have been identified in other papers
dealing with demand uncertainty. For example, work on advance purchase discounts; see Gale and
Holmes (1992, 1993) and Dana (1998).
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v. To see why, first note that the optimal pre-pandemic price is naturally less than v
because consumers value anti-viral drugs less when there is not a pandemic. In the
event of a pandemic, the manufacturer will either raise price to v (if unconstrained)
or price below v (if constrained). Hence, if p is the expected pandemic price then
surely p < v.
To simplify the analysis, it is further assumed that the drug price is such that
consumers do not find it optimal to stockpile. Thus, consumers will be choosing
between buying into an MRP or waiting to purchase in the event of a pandemic. A
suﬃcient condition for a consumer not to find it optimal to stockpile is5
vα
Z 1
0
eqdF (eq)− p < 0.
This condition is not diﬃcult to satisfy. For example, suppose the value of the
drug to a consumer is $50 with seasonal flu and $200 with pandemic influenza. If
the drug is priced to meet seasonal demand - in which case, p = 50 - then this
condition holds as long as the probability that a consumer will need the drug because
of a pandemic is under 25%. Consistent with this assumption is that MRPs have
been introduced in an environment for which there is very little stockpiling by non-
government organizations.
Due to production lags, the drug manufacturer decides on its supply prior to
learning whether there is a pandemic. The marginal cost of producing the drug is
constant at c. It is assumed that αp > c so the drug manufacturer finds it optimal
to stockpile, which it may do on its own or in conjunction with an MRP.6
Though there are two actual manufacturers of anti-viral drugs, our model has
only a single drug manufacturer and thus ignores the eﬀects of competition. First
note that these drugs are far from being perfect substitutes. Tamiflu
R°
is easier to
take than Relenza
R°
as the latter must be inhaled which may make it problematic for
young children or patients with chronic respiratory diseases. It may also be the case
that these two drugs are complements in the event of a pandemic because of concerns
that a virus may become drug-resistant. While competition is still a relevant feature
of the market for anti-viral drugs, there are other important forces at work and our
analysis focuses on some of them.
5This condition compares stockpiling to not buying the drug and is suﬃcient but not necessary
as a consumer may choose not to stockpile because she prefers to wait and purchase it in the event
of a pandemic or buy into an MRP.
6Note that we have assumed consumers do not find it optimal to stockpile while the manufacturer
does. Even without assuming that the drug manufacturer has lower carrying cost of stockpiling due
to scale economies (which would be a natural assumption), firm stockpiling is more eﬃcient than
consumer stockpiling because consumers cannot resell. Thus, a consumer may have a unit of the
drug and, even if there is a pandemic, not need it; while if the drug manufacturer controls the unit
then it can sell it to consumers who need it.
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3 Benchmark Case: Producing without a Manufacturer
Reserve Program
Given the manufacturer prices its anti-viral drug at p - both with and without a
pandemic - let us first examine the optimal supply decision when a Manufacturer
Reserve Program (MRP) is not used. Let K denote the supply produced to deal with
pandemic demand. The manufacturer’s expected profit is
αp
∙Z K
0
eqdF (eq) + Z 1
K
KdF (eq)¸− cK. (1)
With probability α, there is a pandemic of size eq. Given an inventory equal to K,
if eq ≤ K then all pandemic demand can be met, which generates revenue of peq. Ifeq > K then demand outstrips supply in which case revenue is pK.
The manufacturer chooses K to maximize (1). The first-order condition (FOC)
is7
αp [1− F (K)]− c = 0.
The marginal expected revenue from producing one more unit depends on the proba-
bility that the additional unit will be sold, α [1− F (K)], which equals the probability
of a pandemic α times the probability that there is a shortage, which is 1 − F (K).
Solving the FOC, the optimal inventory in preparation for pandemic influenza is:
K∗ ≡ F−1
µ
αp− c
αp
¶
.
For purposes of comparison, consider the case when the manufacturer is able to
raise price to v in response to pandemic influenza. Its expected profit is
αv
∙Z K
0
eqdF (eq) + Z 1
K
KdF (eq)¸− cK, (2)
with FOC:
αv [1− F (K)]− c = 0
The resulting optimal pre-pandemic inventory is
K∗∗ ≡ F−1
µ
αv − c
αv
¶
.
In comparing supply in these two scenarios, the drug manufacturer supplies more
when it is not prevented from increasing price in response to a pandemic (as long as
c > 0):
K∗∗ > K∗ ⇔ F−1
µ
αv − c
αv
¶
> F−1
µ
αp− c
αp
¶
⇔ cα (v − p) > 0.
As it can anticipate a higher price when there is pandemic influenza, the manufacturer
optimally builds a larger inventory in preparing for it.
7The second-order condition is satisfied: −αpF 0 (K) < 0.
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4 Producing with a Manufacturer Reserve Program
4.1 Manufacturer’s Profit Maximization Problem
Now assume the manufacturer oﬀers an MRP so that, for a fee, a customer is assured
of the right to buy anti-viral drugs at the standard price of p in the event of a
pandemic.8 Let R denote the number of MRP contracts sold. R is constrained not
to exceed K since a manufacturer is obligated to have on hand supply to meet all
MRP contracts. However, in the event of a pandemic, we are going to allow the
manufacturer to sell unused MRP supply. That is, if some consumers with an MRP
contract choose not to exercise the option and, at the same time, there is unmet
demand from consumers without an MRP contract, then the company is permitted
to sell the unused MRP supply to non-MRP consumers. This assumption seems
realistic since, if there was excess demand for anti-viral drugs during a pandemic, it
is diﬃcult to believe that a drug manufacturer would be allowed to sit on supply.9
In characterizing the optimal number of MRP contracts and optimal supply, first
note that the manufacturer can always set R = 0, produce K∗, and achieve the same
solution without the availability of the MRP. Thus, if the unique optimal value of R
is positive then the manufacturer prefers to oﬀer an MRP to not doing so.
In solving the manufacturer’s problem, the first step is to determine the equilib-
rium price of an MRP. It depends on the manufacturer’s supply and how many MRP
contracts are oﬀered by the manufacturer (that is, how much supply it commits to its
MRP). Given R and K, we need to determine the maximum willingness to pay for an
MRP contract. For a pandemic of size eq, the fraction of those impacted consumers
who have an MRP contract is R, as the likelihood of needing the drug is indepen-
dent of whether one has a contract.10 As the size of demand from those with MRP
contracts is then eqR, the available supply after meeting MRP obligations is K − eqR.
Given pandemic demand of (1−R) eq from those without an MRP contract, all of
them are supplied if and only if
K − eqR ≥ (1−R) eq ⇔ eq ≤ K.
If instead eq > K then demand from those without an MRP contract exceeds the
available supply. In that case, each non-MRP consumer demanding the drug is as-
sumed to have an equal chance of obtaining the drug, which means a probability
of
K − eqR
(1−R) eq .
The expected net surplus for a non-MRP consumer is then
(v − p)α
∙Z K
0
eqdF (eq) + Z 1
K
eqµ K − eqR
(1−R) eq
¶
dF (eq)¸
8 If it had bought into an MRP, a consumer could buy the drug even if there was no pandemic
though, in this model, the MRP’s value only arises with the occurence of pandemic influenza.
9 In any case, we do not believe our results are sensitive to this assumption.
10 In a richer model with consumer heterogeneity in terms of the risk of exposure to influenza, those
consumers with the highest ex ante probability of exposure would presumably be most likely to buy
into an MRP.
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or
(v − p)α
∙Z K
0
eqdF (eq) + Z 1
K
µ
K − eqR
1−R
¶
dF (eq)¸ (3)
To explain this expression, recall that the surplus from buying the drug during a
pandemic is v − p, as its value to a consumer is v and the price is p. When eq ≤ K,
a non-MRP consumer gets the drug for sure, while if eq > K then the probability of
needing it and being able to buy it is K−?qR1−R .
For a consumer with an MRP contract, her expected surplus is
(v − p)α
Z 1
0
eqdF (eq) . (4)
With probability α
R 1
0 eqdF (eq), she is aﬀected by pandemic influenza in which case
she buys the drug and realizes a net surplus of v−p. Thus, the maximum willingness
to pay for an MRP is (4) minus (3). After some simplification, it equals:
Pmrp (R,K) ≡ (v − p)α
Z 1
K
µeq −K
1−R
¶
dF (eq) . (5)
Having decided to produce K units of the drug and sell R MRP contracts, the
manufacturer will optimally price an MRP contract at Pmrp. Given total supply
of K, note that the price of an MRP contract is increasing in the supply of MRP
contracts:
∂Pmrp (R,K)
∂R
= (v − p)α
Z 1
K
µ eq −K
(1−R)2
¶
dF (eq) > 0.
Given there is a pandemic, expected available supply for those consumers without an
MRP contract is Z 1
0
(K − eqR) dF (eq) ,
which is decreasing in R. Thus, as more MRP contracts are oﬀered, those without a
contract are more likely not to be supplied in the event of a pandemic which raises
how much they are willing to pay to buy into an MRP.
The manufacturer’s problem is:
max
K,R
R (v − p)α
Z 1
K
µeq −K
1−R
¶
dF (eq) + αp ∙Z K
0
eqdF (eq) + Z 1
K
KdF (eq)¸− cK (6)
subject to
R ≤ K.
The first term in (6) is the profit from selling MRP contracts, and the second term
is the expected profit from selling the drug when there is a pandemic. Taking the
derivative of the objective in (6) with respect to R and simplifying, we have:
∂·
∂R
= (v − p)α
Z 1
K
µ eq −K
(1−R)2
¶
dF (eq) > 0. (7)
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Expected profit is then strictly increasing in the number of MRP contracts. Not only
does a manufacturer want to oﬀer an MRP but it commits all supply to the MRP.
That the manufacturer chooses to oﬀer an MRP is not surprising because it allows
additional extraction of the surplus from selling an anti-viral drug in the event of
a pandemic. By having to only pay a price of p, a consumer is left with surplus
of v − p. An MRP extracts some of that surplus by selling the right to buy the
drug in the event of a pandemic. Below we explore how eﬀectively an MRP extracts
post-pandemic surplus.11
As it follows from (7) that R = K, the manufacturer’s problem is
max
K
K (v − p)α
Z 1
K
µeq −K
1−K
¶
dF (eq) + αp ∙Z K
0
eqdF (eq) + Z 1
K
KdF (eq)¸− cK, (8)
and the FOC is
0 = (v − p)α
Z 1
Kmrp
µeq −Kmrp
1−Kmrp
¶
dF (eq) (9)
−Kmrp (v − p)α
Z 1
Kmrp
µ
1− eq
(1−Kmrp)2
¶
dF (eq) + αp [1− F (Kmrp)]− c,
where Kmrp denotes optimal supply with an MRP. Taking the second derivative and
simplifying, we see that the second-order condition is satisfied:
−2 (v − p)α
µ
2−K
(1−K)3
¶Z 1
K
(1− eq) dF (eq)− αpF 0 (K) < 0.
4.2 The Extent of Surplus Extraction by a Manufacturer Reserve
Program
To investigate how well an MRP extracts surplus, consider the incremental gain from
being able to raise price to v when there is a pandemic, over and above that from
having an MRP and being constrained to keeping price fixed at the pre-pandemic
level of p. This gain equals (2) less (8) or
α (v − p)
½Z K
0
eqdF (eq) +K Z 1
K
µ
1− eq
1−K
¶
dF (eq)¾ > 0. (10)
Surplus extraction through an MRP is then incomplete. One reason is that, with an
MRP, consumers are only willing to pay for access to supply when there is a shortage.
Hence, in expectation, they are not willing to pay for access when eq < K for, in that
situation, they would be able to buy the drug at p without having an MRP contract.
However, if the manufacturer could adjust the price of its drug, it would charge a
price of v. Thus, when there is ample supply (that is, eq < K), the expected gain
11Of course, in practice, drug manufacturers do not only sell through an MRP. If we modelled
demand for seasonal flu then the manufacturer would meet that demand outside of an MRP and
thus would engage in both MRP sales and non-MRP sales.Whether this source of demand adequately
explains non-MRP sales is admittedly an open question.
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in expected profit from being able to raise price - relative to keeping price fixed and
having an MRP - is
α (v − p)
Z K
0
eqdF (eq) ;
this is the first term in (10).
The second reason for incomplete surplus extraction is associated with when the
pandemic does exhaust supply, eq > K.When price can be increased, those consumers
who need the drug are the ones who buy it, and, as a result, each pays v which
generates total revenue of vK for the manufacturer. Who gets to buy scarce supply
is then determined after consumers learn whether or not they need the drug. With an
MRP, each of the consumers with an MRP contract only expects to exercise the buy
option with some probability when there is a pandemic; specifically, the probability
is eq when the pandemic size is eq. Their willingness to pay for an MRP is then
determined by the increase in the probability that they can acquire the good, when
they need it. When eq > K, the probability a consumers needs it and gets when they
don’t have an MRP contract isZ 1
K
µ
K − eqK
1−K
¶
dF (eq) ,
and for when they do have an MRP contract isZ 1
K
eqdF (eq) .
The diﬀerence in these probabilities isZ 1
K
µeq −K
1−K
¶
dF (eq) ;
in which case buyers are willing to pay
α (v − p)
Z 1
K
µeq −K
1−K
¶
dF (eq)
for an MRP contract. In the event that there is a shortage, the revenue produced for
the manufacturer is then
α (v − p)
Z 1
K
µeq −K
1−K
¶
dF (eq) + αpK [1− F (K)] . (11)
In contrast, the ex post willingness to pay for the K units is
vK [1− F (K)] , (12)
which is also the revenue earned when the manufacturer can raise its price. The
diﬀerence between (12) and (11) is
α (v − p)
Z 1
K
µ
1− eq
1−K
¶
dF (eq) ,
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which is the second term in (10). In summary, this surplus remains with the consumer
because, with an MRP, the manufacturer extracts surplus prior to consumers learning
who will need the drug in the event of a pandemic. When it can adjust the price of
the drug ex post, the manufacturer is extracting surplus after consumers have learned
who needs the drug. The latter produces full extraction, while the former does not.
Constrained in the price it can charge for its anti-viral drug, a drug manufacturer
is unable to extract all of the surplus created by its drug when there is pandemic
influenza. Through an MRP, it is able to claim some but not all of that residual
surplus by selling the right to buy in the event of a pandemic. The reason for
incomplete surplus extraction is that a consumer is ex ante uncertain that she would
need to exercise the option to buy when there is pandemic influenza. If the pandemic
is mild so there is no shortage of anti-viral drugs or if a consumer is not infected or
exposed and thereby does not need the drug, no value is attached to owning an MRP
contract. These events then reduce how much surplus a manufacturer can extract
through the ex ante sale of the right to buy through an MRP.
4.3 Impact of a Manufacturer Reserve Program on Stockpiling
A central question to ask from a policy perspective is: Does the introduction of a
Manufacturer Reserve Program increase the amount of anti-viral drugs available for
pandemic influenza? Within the context of our model, the question is whether supply
is higher when R is set to maximize the manufacturer’s expected profit compared to
when there is no MRP (so that R = 0). We explore that question in this section.
Let bπ (K) denote expected profit when there is no MRP:
bπ (K) ≡ αp ∙Z K
0
eqdF (eq) + Z 1
K
KdF (eq)¸− cK.
Expected profit with an MRP can then be represented as
bπ (K) +K (v − p)αZ 1
K
µeq −K
1−K
¶
dF (eq) , (13)
where the second term is revenue from selling MRP contracts. Consider the first
derivative of (13):
bπ0 (K) + (v − p)αZ 1
K
µeq −K
1−K
¶
dF (eq)−K (v − p)αZ 1
K
µ
1− eq
(1−K)2
¶
dF (eq) . (14)
Since (13) is strictly concave, supply is higher with an MRP if and only if expected
profit (with an MRP) is increasing when evaluated at optimal supply without an
MRP. Evaluating (14) at K = K∗, this is the case when
(v − p)α
Z 1
K∗
µeq −K∗
1−K∗
¶
dF (eq)−K∗ (v − p)αZ 1
K∗
µ
1− eq
(1−K∗)2
¶
dF (eq) > 0;
and this inequality can be shown to be equivalent to:R 1
K eqdF (eq)
K∗ (2−K∗) [1− F (K∗)] > 1. (15)
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Let us consider the extreme cases when the marginal cost of drug production is
low and is high. In evaluating (15), recall that
K∗ = F−1
µ
αp− c
αp
¶
.
Suppose the cost of drug production is suﬃciently high so that c is close to αp; that
is, per unit cost is close to the expected revenue per unit without an MRP. Since
lim
c→αp
K∗ = 0,
we then want to evaluate (15) as K → 0:
lim
K→0
R 1
K eqdF (eq)
K (2−K) [1− F (K)] = limK→0
R 1
0 eqdF (eq)
K (2−K) [1− F (K)] = +∞.
Thus, for c close to αp,
0 ' K∗ < Kmrp.
Without an MRP, the expected revenue from producing to inventory is αp which
is the probability of a pandemic times price.12 As cost approaches αp, the optimal
supply goes to zero because expected per unit profit goes to zero. Because an MRP
enhances the ability of the manufacturer to extract surplus, the expected revenue
from producing a unit to inventory is higher and equal to
αp+ (v − p)α
Z 1
K
µeq −K
1−K
¶
dF (eq) .
Thus, even when c is close to αp, expected net profit is bounded above zero. As a
result, the manufacturer produces more with an MRP. In fact, when c = αp, the
manufacturer has no pandemic inventory without an MRP, while it has a positive
inventory with an MRP.
Now suppose marginal cost is very low so that optimal supply without an MRP
is close to one (there are then enough drugs for the entire population):
lim
c→0
K∗ = 1.
Using l’Hôpital’s rule, evaluate (15) as K → 1,
lim
K→1
R 1
K eqdF (eq)
K (2−K) [1− F (K)] = limK→1
−KF 0 (K)
2 (1−K) [1− F (K)]−K (2−K)F 0 (K) = −1.
Thus, for c close to zero,
1 ' K∗ > Kmrp.
12Actually, that is expected revenue when the manufacturer can be assured of selling the good in
the event of a pandemic, which is the case if its inventory is close to zero.
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When the cost of producing anti-viral drugs is very low, a manufacturer without
an MRP produces close to maximal pandemic demand in order to be able to meet
all levels of pandemic demand. However, with an MRP, it restricts supply in order
to create a possible shortage which, in anticipation of, results in consumers willing
to pay a higher price for an MRP contract. Note that as K → 1, the value of an
MRP goes to zero since there is sure to be suﬃcient supply even if there is pandemic
influenza.13 The preceding results are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The manufacturer’s pandemic inventory is higher (lower) with a
Manufacturer Reserve Program when cost is suﬃciently close to αp (zero).
To understand why stockpiling can be less with an MRP, consider the case when
c = 0 so that, in the absence of an MRP, the manufacturer produces enough drugs to
meet the maximal pandemic size of 1. Now introduce an MRP. With an inventory of
size 1, the value of an MRP contract is zero;14 since there will always be an adequate
supply of anti-viral drugs then no consumer would buy an option to purchase. Thus,
the expected revenue (and profit) of the manufacturer is that from pandemic sales of
the drug:
pα
Z 1
0
eqdF (eq) .
Now suppose the manufacturer reduces supply by a small amount ε. This supply
reduction lowers expected drug sales by
pα
Z 1
1−ε
[eq − (1− ε)] dF (eq) ' pα (ε/2) [1− F (1− ε)] .
If the pandemic size exceeds 1−ε, it no longer has the supply to meet that additional
demand. Note that revenue is reduced on the order of ε2; that is, with a small
probability, pandemic drug sales are reduced by a small amount. That same reduction
in supply causes a rise in revenue from the sale of MRP contracts equal to
(1− ε)Pmrp (1− ε) = (1− ε) (v − p)α
Z 1
1−ε
µeq − (1− ε)
1− (1− ε)
¶
dF (eq)
' (v − p)α
µ
1− ε
2
¶
[1− F (1− ε)] ,
13Setting R = K, the market price of an MRP contract is
Pmrp (K,K) ≡ Pmrp (K) = (v − p)α
? 1
K
??q −K
1−K
?
dF (?q) .
Since
Pmrp (K) ≤ (v − p)α
? 1
K
?
1−K
1−K
?
dF (?q) = (v − p)α [1− F (K)] ,
then
lim
K→1
Pmrp (K) ≤ lim
K→1
(v − p)α [1− F (K)] = 0,
which implies
lim
K→1
Pmrp (K) = 0.
14This property is proven in footnote 12.
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where Pmrp (K) is the price of an MRP contract when supply is K (and is exclusively
sold through an MRP), and recall that Pmrp (1) = 0. By reducing its supply by ε, a
manufacturer’s revenue from selling MRP contracts increases on the order of ε which
exceeds the fall in pandemic drug sales as it is on the order of ε2. Thus, revenue and
profit rise with this supply reduction.
On a more intuitive level, when a manufacturer would have a large stockpile
(as is the case when c is small), it’ll be selling a large number of MRP contracts
as stockpiling is done through an MRP. By restricting supply, it makes having an
MRP contract more valuable since it is more likely that a consumer will need the
drug. This rise in price results in surplus extraction from every consumer buying an
MRP contract. While the smaller supply could mean smaller drug sales when there
is a pandemic, that is a small revenue loss which occurs only when the size of the
pandemic is large, which is a low probability event.
More precise results can be derived when the breadth of pandemic influenza is
uniformly distributed. Assuming F (eq) = eq, ∀eq ∈ [0, 1] , optimal supply without an
MRP is
K∗ =
αp− c
αp
.
Solving (9) yields the optimal supply with an MRP:
Kmrp =
α (v + p)− 2c
2αv
.
We then have:
K∗ −Kmrp =
µ
αp− c
αp
¶
−
µ
α (v + p)− 2c
2αv
¶
;
and it is straightforward to show:
sign {K∗ −Kmrp} = sign {αp− 2c} .
Proposition 2 Assume F is a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The manufacturer’s
pandemic inventory is higher (lower) with a Manufacturer Reserve Program when
c > (<) αp2 .
If marginal production cost is suﬃciently small relative to price p (or expected
revenue αp) then the introduction of an MRP reduces a drug company’s pre-pandemic
inventory of anti-viral drugs. For the case when cost is not relatively small, an MRP
promotes the expansion of stockpiling. This raises the question of when these two
cases might occur. Subsidies which lower a manufacturer’s cost make it more likely
that c is small and thus more likely that an MRP would reduce pre-pandemic supply.
Price caps - by lowering p - have an opposite and, therefore, an MRP induces an
expansion in supply. We can also interpret these results in terms of regulation of the
price-cost margin. Suppose the price-cost margin is required not to exceed r and that
it is binding so that a drug manufacturer sets price so that:
p− c
c
= r or p = c (1 + r) .
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Hence,
αp
2
− c = αc (1 + r)
2
− c = αc
2
µ
r − 2− α
α
¶
.
It follows from the previous proposition that more stringent price-cost regulation -
smaller r - makes it more likely the environment is one in which an MRP would
promote stockpiling.
These results were derived under some strong simplifying assumptions about con-
sumer demand, none of which we feel are necessary for the delivered insight. If
consumers are risk averse then this would enhance the value of a customer having
the option to buy anti-viral drugs, and thus increase the price that could be charged
for an MRP contract. This greater demand for an MRP should only increase the
desire of the drug manufacturer to, under certain conditions, limit supply in order to
drive up the price of an MRP contract. A second factor one might want to allow for
is insurance in connection with pharmaceutical products. Suppose now that a con-
sumer’s co-pay is θp, where θ ∈ (0, 1), and p continues to be the price charged by the
drug manufacturer. Now, a consumer is willing to buy the drug during a pandemic
as long as p ≤ v/θ. The manufacturer may then charge a higher price which makes
it more likely that p is high relative to c and thus, by our preceding analysis, that an
MRP will induce smaller supply. At the same time, that a consumer only pays part
of the drug price means there is more surplus associated with getting the drug so a
consumer is willing to pay a higher price for an MRP contract.15 As a third and final
point concerning robustness, the model has only allowed for one consumer type. The
analysis will clearly be more complicated with heterogeneous consumers but again
the same type of manufacturer incentives ought to exist. What drives our results is
that there is some probability that the pandemic size will exceed available supply so
that there is excess demand. That property should occur as well when consumers
are heterogenous. It is the prospect of a shortage that determines the price of an
MRP contract and makes an MRP a critical source of revenue for the manufacturer.
There is no reason to think that it would not be the case that the manufacturer would
find it optimal to limit supply under an MRP in order to raise the price of an MRP
contract.
5 Concluding Remarks
One of the measures that society can take to prepare for pandemic influenza is to
stockpile anti-viral drugs which, in the event of a pandemic, can be taken prophy-
lactically to avoid infection or for treatment in the event of infection. While the
U.S. government has built a significant stockpile of anti-viral drugs, non-government
organizations such as hospitals have been hesitant to do so, presumably because of
the high cost of purchasing anti-viral drugs. To make stockpiling more attractive,
drug manufacturers have developed Manufacturer Reserve Programs which, for an
annual fee, ensures the right to buy anti-viral drugs. With an MRP, it is the drug
15 Insurance may not be that relevant since MRP contracts are largely purchased by organizations
- such as hospitals and corporations - who may be self-insuring.
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manufacturer that stockpiles in order to supply those consumers which have an MRP
contract and then exercise the right to buy.
In this paper, we have shown that an MRP enhances drug manufacturer profit by
allowing it to extract a bigger share of the surplus created by anti-viral drugs when
there is a severe outbreak of influenza. An MRP allows a drug manufacturer to partly
- though not fully - circumvent the political and ethical constraints of not being able
to fully raise the price of its anti-viral drug in response to pandemic influenza. While
an MRP enhances drug manufacturer profit, it may or may not serve the social goal
of promoting pre-pandemic stockpiling. If the cost of producing an anti-viral drug
is suﬃciently high then - by augmenting the revenue earned from production - an
MRP increases the optimal supply of a drug manufacturer relative to when no such
program is oﬀered. However, when production cost is suﬃciently low, introducing
an MRP reduces the amount of pre-pandemic stockpiling. Since the value of buying
into an MRP is higher when the likelihood of a pandemic-induced shortage is greater,
the drug manufacturer limits its inventory in order to create an anticipated shortage
and thereby increase the price that consumers are willing to pay for the right to buy
in the event of a pandemic. The gain in revenue from MRP contracts is realized on
every contract sold, while the loss in revenue from having smaller pandemic drug sales
(due to lower supply) only occurs when there is a shortage. When such a shortage
is unlikely - which is the case when pre-pandemic supply (without an MRP) is large
- then an MRP reduces supply; while if such a shortage is likely - which is the case
when pre-pandemic supply (without an MRP) is low - then an MRP enhances supply.
In short, Manufacturer Reserve Programs could either hurt or help in preventing the
spread of pandemic influenza, and which is the case must be carefully evaluated.
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